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Abstract—Day to day interactions with wearable and pervasive systems lead to collected data
that capture various aspects of human behavior and enable machine learning algorithms to
extract extensive information about users. We discuss privacy risk awareness, and ways to
preserve privacy and integrate it in current frameworks.
PERVASIVE COMPUTING has penetrated
every aspect of everyday life from smart wearable
devices to smart homes and cities. Smart wear-
ables are already becoming a daily necessity as
people rely on them to meet their needs and goals.
Users can continuously track their physiological
parameters like heart rate, calories, quality of
sleep, and daily activities such as water intake.
It is now common for users to make payments
using their smartwatches and smartphones, or
give commands to voice assistants for tasks they
need to perform. The data collected from these
services are used to allow service providers to bet-
ter understand their users, improve the quality of
services and offer personalization. For example,
Transport for London used Wi-Fi access points
to track mobile phones of commuters and, based
on the data, analyze journeys in the transportation
network. The tracking initiative helped to deter-
mine busy routes, congestion forecasts, and alter-
native travel recommendations, which ultimately
increase efficiency of the transportation service
[1]. Singapore is another nation that is leveraging
wearable and IoT technologies to offer smart
healthcare to their citizens. To combat the spread
of COVID-19, Singapore has introduced ‘Trace-
Together,’ a mobile application for community-
driven contact-tracing [2]. Contacts are monitored
by exchanging identifiers via Bluetooth hand-
shake between two smartphones running the app.
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The identifiers are shared with a health authority
if a user gets infected with COVID-19 to inform
potentially infected individuals [3].
The above examples highlight that sensors,
devices, and data are transforming societies and
offer benefits from science to services, includ-
ing transportation, safety, healthcare. However,
the same data that offer so many benefits are
increasing security and privacy concerns because
data analytics can disclose personal data, includ-
ing behavior, preferences, and health state. For
example, researchers recently found that 19 out
of the 24 medical apps they sampled leak data
with 55 entities, including third and fourth parties
[4]. Lately, the list of emerging data leaks and
privacy risks have been growing as evidenced by
the constant privacy breaches reported in the news
[5].
PREDICTIVE AND QUANTITATIVE
PRIVACY HARMS
Governing bodies are forced by the increas-
ing public awareness to advance regulations and
controls on new technologies. For instance, op-
erating systems and web browsers are adding
user controls, blocking cookies and setting new
rules on tracking [6]. Despite these efforts, as
technology and application advance so do the pre-
dictive and quantitative privacy harms and risks
that emerge. Predictive privacy harms refer to
inappropriate inclusion of, or predictive analysis,
from an individual’s personal data without their
knowledge or expressed consent. The issue with
predictive harms is that the continuous collection
and analysis of detailed personal data can be
used to re-identify and profile users to predict
their behavior [7]. However, ubiquitous data such
as those collected for wearable and IoT devices
are not recognized as personal data in all of
the existing directives. Quantitative privacy harms
refer to threats posed by modern technologies
relating to how often and to what extend private
data are collected. The harms are brought on in
cases where there is excessive and ubiquitous data
collection [8]. Users expect the majority of their
data will remain private. For example, users of
an arbitrary smartphone app might not care about
sharing their location once, but they will expect
that they are not tracked throughout a whole day.
Wearable and IoT devices are at particularly high
risk of creating harm because they enable services
to gather personal data (e.g. behaviour, health)
that does retain economical and social value even
tens of years after it was acquired.
The main privacy challenges in wearable and
IoT ecosystems include obtaining consent for data
collection, allowing users to to meaningfully and
intelligibly control and choose the data they share,
meanwhile ensuring the use of collected data is
limited to the stated purpose [9]. The potential
for misuse arises from the pervasive tracking of
habits, behaviors, and locations through sensors
and user interaction over a long period. There
are new risks to personal safety as a result of
the prevalence of wearable and IoT systems [10].
For example, mapping a user’s running route from
fitness tracking data can expose the user’s home
address as it is usually the starting and endpoint
of the map. By combining physical activity and
heart rate measurements, fitness level and trend,
as well as diseases are identifiable [11, 12].
Here, we discuss privacy awareness and re-
quirements that should be considered to integrate
privacy into wearable and IoT services. We de-
scribe a privacy risk-aware framework that works
like a data firewall around the personal wearable
and IoT device ecosystem. Our system can guide
technology developers and service providers to
incorporate privacy risk awareness, design prin-
ciples and mitigation methods in the life-cycle
of service design and development, thus enabling
privacy-preserving data management.
PRIVACY AWARENESS AND
PREFERENCES
In order to design privacy-aware systems and
services, understanding a user’s preferences and
concerns is of great importance. Factors such as
social relationships, transparency of the mech-
anisms, context and who is collecting the data
are important determinants. Different studies have
found that individuals thought monitoring in per-
sonal spaces and by an unknown entity or the
government was unacceptable. Another finding
was that photo and video monitoring cause pri-
vacy concerns regardless of the context [13].
Although information privacy, data sharing
and control are universal issues, the precise con-
cerns and responses to data sharing requests de-
pend on the trustworthiness of the wearable and
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IoT services and user characteristics, including
the user’s culture and age [14]. The extent of
these concerns depend on factors such as the
type of data collected, retention time, purpose
of data collection, trust in the service provider
and perceived value of the data collected [15].
In regards to individuals’ privacy preferences for
wearable sensors, studies show that users want to
have control of the data they produce. Especially
for people who are aware of the risks and have
privacy concerns, data control has a significant
influence on their acceptance of technology [16].
When sharing personal data, there are various
competing factors like those discussed previously
that are involved in each decision, such as motiva-
tions, purposes, and personal preferences. There
are situations and contexts under which the users
are concerned and reluctant to share data, while
in other situations not as much. So to address pri-
vacy issues, regulations and privacy-aware mech-
anisms, user preferences and perceived risks are
important factors for technology acceptance.
PERSONALIZING PRIVACY
We need frameworks that will allow users to
personalize their privacy based on their use and
privacy expectations. Also, to raise awareness, it
would be useful to develop tools that will help the
users select what type of data to provide in each
service or apply data transformations and privacy-
enhancing techniques before sharing them.
We gathered the following key requirements
for the design of privacy risk-aware frameworks
around wearable and IoT ecosystems:
Privacy Risk Awareness: There is a need for
methods that will provide continuous privacy risk
assessments. In user-centered services, this could
be achieved by calculating the privacy risk of a
user based on the accumulated knowledge that
exists about him from the data collected, based
on the services and devices he currently uses.
The privacy risk calculations should also include
the potential insights that could be gained from
combinations of separately shared data items.
The challenge is to evaluate privacy in terms of
risk-benefit trade-offs that will enable the users
to make informed decisions about data sharing.
Also, there is a need for user-friendly tools and
interfaces that explain risks and benefits, and
advise the user.
Data Control: Users should be able to share
the data collected by their wearable and IoT
devices with the third parties they prefer and
negotiate the conditions for the sharing. Instead
of asking for decisions at each sharing occasion,
sharing should take place according to user pref-
erences set in advance. The user preferences will
specify the conditions under which data will be
shared, such as type of data (e.g., photos, sensor
readings), retention time, granularity and volume
of the data.
Data Transformation: Privacy-preserving
mechanisms that will transform the data accord-
ing to their privacy risk, user preferences, and
the data-sharing agreements are another important
requirement. For instance, current anonymity [17]
and differential privacy [18] techniques could be
modified to include individuals’ privacy risk.
Privacy and Security: Through the life-cycle
of the data from collection to storage and analysis
data need to be kept secure and applications
should preserve the privacy of individuals by
keeping data safe from observation, copying and
malicious adversaries.
A PRIVACY RISK AWARE
FRAMEWORK
Our privacy risk-aware framework to address
the above requirements is based on a Trusted
Privacy Mediator. The Trusted Privacy Mediator
can be thought of as a private cloudlet with data
storage located in the user’s domain (i.e., a com-
puter or smartphone). The framework attempts
to enable users to make privacy-aware decisions
about sharing personal data and to automatically
transform data according to their sensitivity and
user preferences. We consider an example of
providing care within a smart home (Figure 1).
Here, data owners are smart home users that
sign up to services. Their smart home setup
might include wearable and IoT health monitor-
ing devices, and actuators that remotely control
appliances. Service providers collect and store
user data and create machine learning detec-
tion/prediction models either for their own use or
for data consumers, who are care providers that
use the services to gain insights, monitor patients
and offer remote diagnosis.
1. Initial Set Up
The Trusted Privacy Mediator acts as a proxy
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Figure 1. Components and phases of the Privacy Risk Aware Framework. (1) The Trusted Privacy Mediator
is installed on the user’s device, where it discovers and authenticates devices, and assigns sensitivity weights
to the collected data. (2) The privacy risk metric component receives the sensitivity weights and derives the
privacy risk of the user. The privacy risk is then combined with user preferences to create a user privacy
profile. In turn, the privacy profile is used as a basis for the negotiation and creation of custom privacy policy
agreements. (3) The custom privacy policies are sent to the data transformation component that anonymizes
and obfuscates the data according to the policy. The data transformation component is based on an adaptation
of a deep learning autoencoder model that uses one encoder with multiple decoders to create the transformed
subsets. (4) Subsets of transformed data are shared to the corresponding service provider.
between the user’s personal data and the ser-
vice providers. The Trusted Privacy Mediator
discovers and authenticates the wearable and IoT
devices owned by the user and collects their data.
For instance, the Trusted Privacy Mediator will at-
tempt to connect to the smart blood pressure cuff,
smartwatch, smart thermostat and other devices in
the local networks.
2. Privacy Risk Aware Negotiation
The Privacy Negotiation Agent offers fine-
grained control over the data sharing, aligned with
the user’s preference. At the same time, services
booked by the user need to get supplied with
sufficient data to function. Custom privacy policy
agreements are the basis for data sharing. The
initial privacy preferences are set up by users via
a mobile app or web portal. As setting up fine-
grained privacy preferences can be tedious, public
templates and recommendations can be deployed
(more advanced versions of the framework could
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also implement agents that are able to learn a
user’s privacy preferences over time).
Subsequently, once the inventory has been
established, a Privacy Risk metric is used to
calculate the privacy risk of the user based on
the sensitivity of the data items and the insights
that could be gained from combinations with
previously shared data. The User Privacy Profile
is utilized by the Privacy Negotiation Agent to
negotiate customized privacy policy agreements
with service providers on behalf of the user and
offer recommendations on data sharing. Each
service that requests data will share its privacy
policy that specifies what type of data it expects
and at what granularity, as well as how long the
data will be stored. The policy might also include
other conditions related to the use of data, along
with potential rewards and benefits for the user.
Thus, for each new service or data request, the
Privacy Negotiation Agent will aim to find an
agreement with the service provider in a way
that provides a beneficial privacy risk-trade off
for the user and is in line with the user’s privacy
preferences.
3. Data Transformation
Depending on the privacy policy agreement
and the type of service provider (e.g., trusted
or not), the Trusted Privacy Mediator will apply
different privacy-enhancing mechanisms to the
data. Key concerns are to determine the appropri-
ate obfuscation level and dealing with situations
where privacy risks are high but the user is willing
to share the data. One option for trusted care
providers is that the Trusted Privacy Mediator
shares an anonymized data subset, where data
irrelevant to the service are excluded. For non-
trusted service providers, stricter data transforma-
tion includes adding random noise, i.e., to provide
differential privacy guarantees.
4. Data Sharing A user requests a service,
then the service providers send their data requests
and data agreement offers to the user. Each ser-
vice provider might propose numerous offers and
services. After agreeing with the service provider
on the privacy policy that satisfies both the service
provider and the user, the Trusted Privacy Medi-
ator component ensures that the data are appro-
priately handled by applying data transformation
techniques to any sensitive information that the
service provider should not receive. At the end
of the process, the appropriate de-sensitized data
are shared to the service providers.
Following the example of providing care in a
smart home, Figure 2 shows the different subsets
of data that are shared by the Trusted Privacy
Mediator based on the service request (the data
transformation and anonymization method with
encoders-decoders is described in detail in [19]).
In this example, there are two service requests-
one to a hospital physician for medical diagnosis,
and another to a smart meter company for saving
energy costs. To evaluate the data transforma-
tions, we used pointwise mutual information as a
metric to quantify the information shared between
two variables. A PMI(x, y) = 0 indicates that
variables x and y are statistically independent.
PMI(x; y) = log
P (x, y)
P (x)P (y)
Mutual information reflects the change in the
uncertainty of a private variable (i.e., address)
due to the observation of a public variable (i.e.,
energy consumption). It is used to measure the
amount of information leaked from a privacy
mechanism by comparing the distribution of the
original data and that of obfuscated data an ad-
versary has gained access to. Figure 2(a) shows
that attributes not relevant for a data consuming
hospital physician, such as the variables Energy
Consumption and Thermostat state, have been
removed by the Trusted Privacy Mediator. On the
other hand, data such as Name, Address, Phone
Number, Blood Pressure and Wearable Pedometer
remain with little to no transformations because
they are needed for the service. When sharing
data with the smart meter company, Figure 2(b)
illustrates that the Trusted Privacy Mediator has
anonymized and removed personally identifiable
data while sharing obfuscated sensor readings
with the service provider.
Advances still have to be made on several
aspects of the framework discussed here in order
to be able to implement it fully. In particular,
methods that are able to understand and learn
the user preferences and perform the negotiation
to meet their expectations should be investigated
further. Another challenge is the development
of computational privacy risk metrics that can
accurately derive the privacy risk of a user based
on the data collected and shared about the user.
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(a) Hospital physician (b) Smart meter company
Figure 2. Mutual Information between the original data and the data transformed by the Trusted Privacy
Mediator when sharing with (a) hospital physician and (b) smart meter company.
Nevertheless, privacy risk and awareness are in-
creasingly making such endeavors worthwhile.
We are entering a new era where the types and
quantities of personal information being collected
and shared are growing exponentially. The shifts
in the way services harvest, and users generate,
data create unlimited possibilities but also add
new privacy challenges. As mobile, wearable, and
IoT-based services expand, they must incorporate
privacy from the conception phase in expectation
of harms and provide measures for ongoing as-
sessments.
The privacy landscape will keep changing
as users become more aware of privacy risks
and demand more privacy protection from ser-
vice providers. Privacy risk-aware frameworks
can change the way data are stored, processed and
shared. Potentially, we will move to an even more
decentralized way of collecting, managing and
sharing data in which each service provider will
have to subscribe to a user’s individual data rather
than the other way around. Therefore, privacy
awareness and risk are key to address the privacy
protection challenge.
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